Lacan and Bataille on the sacred, taboo, and transgression
The Parallax ViewThe book presents Jacques Lacan and Georges Bataille as thinkers who meet around the sacred, prohibition, and the lure of an impossible excess, but it treats their affinity as a problem rather than a settled synthesis. Bataille’s account of transgression helps illuminate the dangerous edge of Lacan’s ethics seminar: the desire to go beyond ordinary, pleasure-oriented life can appear to promise authenticity, yet it can also become an immersion in overwhelming enjoyment. The decisive distinction is whether excess remains bound to the law that it violates, or whether the law itself is understood as the destabilizing force that unsettles ordinary life.
A shared vocabulary of excess
The comparison begins with Lacan’s ethical maxim, as discussed in the book, not to compromise desire. The book places it alongside Bataille’s call to think to an extreme point, where apparently opposed states approach one another: pain and bliss, erotic enjoyment and death, sainthood and dissolution. Bataille’s writing on eroticism, including its use of an image of extreme suffering, serves as an example of this effort to test the limits of experience. The point of the comparison is not that the two thinkers simply recommend the same conduct, but that each confronts the temptation to identify extremity with truth.
Their concepts of the sacred also appear to converge. Bataille’s sacred and accursed domain is compared with the domain Lacan associates with ate in his discussion of Antigone. The book connects Bataille’s distinction between homogeneity, the order of exchange, and heterogeneity, the order of limitless expenditure, with Lacan’s distinction between symbolic exchange and a traumatic encounter with the Real. Bataille’s account of heterogeneous reality as force or shock sharpens the resemblance: in each framework, an excess interrupts a world organized by stable exchange. The comparison also notes Bataille’s elevation of the dissolute woman to divine status beside Lacan’s claim that Woman is one of the names of God. These are presented as unexpected echoes, not proof that the concepts are identical.
The timing of Lacan’s ethics seminar and Bataille’s Eroticism is noted as a suggestive coincidence. The book asks whether the overlap indicates more than coincidence, but does not establish a direct causal influence. Its emphasis instead falls on how closely the two bodies of thought can be read together around the sacred, expenditure, transgression, and the limits of symbolic order.
Prohibition and transgression
Bataille’s position is especially important because he recognizes that transgression depends on prohibition. He opposes the idea that sexual permissiveness, or the neglect of sexual interdictions, can by itself resolve the problem of sexual disorder. In his account, human potential cannot be imagined without interdictions. The book draws out the consequence: transgression does not simply abolish a boundary but takes its meaning from the boundary it crosses.
This interdependence reaches its sharpest form in Bataille’s account of crime and punishment. The criminal may, in Bataille’s formulation, want death as the answer to the crime, so that the sanction completes what the crime set in motion. The consequence is a closed circuit in which violation seeks the law’s confirmation. Bataille’s repeated insistence that system and excess are both needed captures this structure: excess does not stand outside order in a simple opposition but remains dependent on the order it disrupts.
The same tension shapes Bataille’s response to revolution. He is drawn to revolutionary excess, yet fears that a revolution will be contained in a new order, potentially more homogeneous than the capitalist order it replaces. Political rupture promises intoxication; afterward, the world may remake itself and give oppression another form. The book relates this concern to Bataille’s opposition to communism and to his interest in both communism and fascism as excesses of life against democratic appearances. The connection is not an endorsement of either political movement; it shows how the drive toward an extreme can be politically ambivalent and vulnerable to renewed containment.
Lacan’s ethical impasse
The book therefore challenges the reading of Lacan’s Ethics of Psychoanalysis as a straightforward statement of his mature position. It describes the seminar instead as a point of deadlock, where Lacan comes close to a familiar passion for the Real: a demand to go to the limit, enter the terrifying domain of ate, and refuse compromise. The maxim about desire, the book stresses, was not used again by Lacan in his later work. Its exceptional status matters because the maxim can be read as an invitation to an extreme experience whose ethical meaning remains uncertain.
That uncertainty appears in the relation between pure desire and primordial enjoyment. The subject who refuses to compromise desire seems to cross beyond the social world of servicing goods; yet that gesture may be difficult to distinguish from disappearing into an abyss of enjoyment. The book identifies this as the problem named by Lacan’s formulation Kant avec Sade: not a triumphant solution in which Sade simply discloses the truth of Kant, but an embarrassing difficulty that the ethics seminar does not fully resolve. The resemblance to Bataille makes the difficulty more visible, since the pursuit of the impossible may be construed either as an ethical stance or as an extreme surrender to enjoyment.
Within the seminar, the account of law and desire shifts. In Chapter IV, Lacan follows a transgressive model in which prohibition generates the desire to violate it. Later, toward the end of the seminar, he moves toward the Kantian formula in which the moral law is directly identical to pure desire. This movement marks a crucial difference from Bataille’s settled dialectic: for Bataille, transgressive desire remains generated by prohibition, whereas the Kantian possibility makes the law itself an excess that shatters the stability of ordinary, pleasure-oriented life. The book argues that Lacan oscillates over this distinction rather than cleanly resolving it.
From the transgressive circuit to drive
The proposed way through the impasse comes from Lacan’s later account of enjoyment, especially as the book associates it with Seminar XXIII and with Chiesa’s interpretation. There is no substantial Thing of enjoyment waiting beyond the Symbolic. Enjoyment is not a final substance that a sufficiently extreme act can attain; it arises through a movement that repeatedly misses its goal. Its pleasure lies in the repeated failure itself.
That account changes the force of the comparison with Bataille. If enjoyment depends on prohibition and its violation, the subject can become caught in the very circuit Bataille describes: a transgression that needs the law to sustain its meaning. If, instead, enjoyment is understood through the repeated failure of a drive to reach its goal, the answer is not a final passage into limitless satisfaction. Drive names a repetitive circulation around the goal. On this reading, Lacan’s Kant avec Sade does not dissolve the tension between pure desire and primordial enjoyment; it names a deadlock constitutive of desire, whose possible passage is drive.
The contrast gives the relation its critical shape. Bataille makes the dependence of excess on prohibition explicit and sees the risk that revolutionary excess will be enclosed again by a new order. Lacan’s later theory, as presented here, shifts attention from the imagined completion of transgression to the structure of its repeated failure. The comparison thus exposes both the force and the limit of the passion for the impossible: it can unsettle a world of ordinary exchange, but extremity alone cannot guarantee freedom from the law or from the enjoyment that the law helps organize.